Who Framed Roger Rabbit: Personhood

“Who Framed Roger Rabbit”, directed by Robert Zemeckis, is usually looked at for its technical achievements and critical success, but it can also be viewed as a discussion for the classification of ‘personhood’.  The film can be related to various ethnic minority issues throughout history as the Toons are often treated as second class citizens.  This point is emphasized by the existence of ‘human only’ clubs, and Toons being payed less than Humans for similar employment.  These issues, both real and within the film, were born from the refusal to accept certain social and ethnic groups as ‘people’ because they were not viewed as being fully human (Falzon, 2007).  These past claims, thankfully, cannot be supported when the status of personhood is looked at philosophically.  Locke and Kant shared the view that personhood is characterised by rationality; the ability to decide and create purpose for existence (Falzon, 2007).  Midgely feels that emotion and sociability play a more integral part in determining personhood (Falzon, 2007).  Nearly any functioning human being, regardless of ethnic or social status, can be classed as a ‘person’ and therefore equal to other ‘persons’ under these criteria.  But what of non-human beings?  Can certain animals or objects feel emotions or rationalise their existence?  Are they equal to human ‘persons’?

This brings me to the Squeaky Shoe issue within “Who Framed Roger Rabbit?”  During one of the more disturbing scenes of the film, Judge Doom (Christopher Lloyd) lowers a Toon shoe into a vat of ‘Dip’, destroying the Shoe completely.   The problem with this is that the Squeaky Shoe obviously portrays various levels of sentience.  While maybe not considered intelligent, it clearly exhibits fear and pain as it is disintegrated, and a want for affection only moments before.  The Squeaky Shoe could be considered on the level of a ‘real’ animal in the sense that it is alive, but not capable of rational thought or intelligence.  But lowering a real animal into a vat of concentrated hydrochloric acid would be considered by most Westerners as extremely immoral.  But what about destroying a real shoe?  Is that considered immoral?  Most people would say ‘no’, a real shoe has no mind, thoughts, emotions or sentience to be considered.  A shoe is a tool created by humans to benefit humans.  So is the Squeaky Shoe an animal or an object?  Is it alive?  Is it a ‘person’?  It has eyes, a mouth, a voice, appears to display emotions, yet it is a shoe. 

According to Locke and Kant the Squeaky Shoe may not be considered to be a ‘person’ as it does not seem to show any rationality, and therefore can be destroyed without moral qualms.  However, Litch raises the point that infants, small children, and retarded adults are not rational, but killing them is considered morally wrong (2002).  Midgely’s ideas of emotion and sociability as a prerequisite to personhood seems to better fit the Squeaky Shoe, but this implies that certain animals could be considered ‘persons’ such as dolphins, primates, dogs and cats.  Yet many Westerners would not accept these animals as equal in rights and status, and would consider many as property or pets.  There are many more Toons that exhibit more overt ‘person’ qualities than the Squeaky Shoe, such as Benny the Cab who displays complex emotional, social, and conversational skills.  Could a car be considered a ‘person’?

References

Falzon, C. (2007). Philosophy goes to the movies (2^nd ed.). New York: Routledge

Litch, Mary M. (2002), Philosophy Through Film, London: Routledge. Chapter 4.